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When the Badge and the Ring Walk Together

  • Writer: ALAN S BERNSTEIN, P.A.
    ALAN S BERNSTEIN, P.A.
  • 30 minutes ago
  • 21 min read

LEGAL COMMENTARY

PART 1 OF 2

How One Florida Police Department Built an Institutional Partnership with a Social Media Vigilante—and What Their Own Records Reveal


Written February 13, 2026 by Alan S. Bernstein P.A.

⏱  21-minute read

ICAC protocols, internal police emails, CAD dispatch logs, sworn depositions, and body-worn camera footage reveal a constitutional crisis hiding in plain sight.

 

A Note from the Author

The author believes that protecting children from exploitation is among the most important functions of law enforcement. This article advocates not for leniency toward those who prey on children, but for the constitutional methods that ensure predators are brought to justice in a manner that survives appellate review and actually keeps communities safe.

Editor’s Note on Anonymization

To maintain focus on the systemic and constitutional issues rather than the individuals involved, the civilian operatives central to these operations are identified by role throughout this article. The individual who organized and led the 561 Predator Catchers operation is referred to as “Catcher 1.” The individual who served as a decoy through the affiliated People vs Preds channel is referred to as “Decoy 1.” Where their names appear in direct quotations from official records, depositions, or internal communications, bracketed designations [Catcher 1] or [Decoy 1] have been substituted editorially. All underlying source documents reference the individuals by their legal names and are available through the public record.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

▶  ICAC protocols explicitly prohibit law enforcement from collaborating with civilian vigilante groups—yet DBPD did exactly that.

▶  DBPD’s own internal emails use the word “vigilante” to describe 561 Predator Catchers while acknowledging the group as a primary case source.

▶  Officers coached 561PC on evidence gathering, provided arrest checklists, and even directed the creation of the group’s YouTube channel.

▶  The operation used AI-altered photos to fabricate evidence, wiped devices, and destroyed digital records—potential violations of at least 10 Florida and federal statutes.

▶  CAD dispatch logs show real-time coordination: 561PC directed police to delay arrival while the group conducted its own pre-arrival procedures.

▶  An ICAC Task Force detective was personally processing 561PC warrant requests—violating the very protocols his task force membership requires.

 

There is a principle so foundational to American criminal justice that we rarely stop to articulate it: the power to investigate, arrest, and prosecute belongs to the government, and with that power comes a corresponding obligation to respect the constitutional rights of every person—including the accused. When that power is outsourced to private citizens operating without oversight, without training, and with a financial stake in the outcome, the entire system begins to buckle. When police go further—actively training those civilians, directing them to create monetized social media channels, providing checklists on how to secure arrests, and then prosecuting the resulting cases while ignoring felonies committed by the vigilantes themselves—the system does not merely buckle. It breaks.

A series of cases currently pending in Palm Beach County, Florida, have pulled back the curtain on a practice that should alarm anyone who cares about the rule of law. According to court filings, sworn depositions, over 975 pages of internal police emails obtained through a Florida Sunshine Law request, Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) logs, body-worn camera footage, and investigative journalism from the Palm Beach Post, the Delray Beach Police Department developed an extensive working relationship with a social media vigilante operation called “561 Predator Catchers”—and its affiliated decoy group “People vs Preds”—despite federal ICAC protocols explicitly prohibiting such collaboration, despite the department’s own personnel warning that the partnership was dangerous and wrong, and despite sworn testimony from a DBPD sergeant that he wishes the department had never gone down this road.

What makes this story extraordinary is not that it rests on inference or speculation. The department’s own emails, its own CAD dispatch logs, its own body-worn camera footage, and the sworn testimony of its own officers tell the story in their own words. As the United States Supreme Court warned in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), government conduct that “shocks the conscience” offends “those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.” What has unfolded in Delray Beach shocks the conscience.

This is Part 1 of a two-part series. Part 1 examines how the partnership was built—what ICAC prohibits, how 561 Predator Catchers became a de facto arm of the Delray Beach Police Department, and what the department’s own internal records reveal. Part 2 will examine the constitutional consequences: Miranda violations, coercive interrogation tactics, evidence destruction, a 6% conviction rate, and the broader implications for communities across America.

 

What Is ICAC—and Why Does Its Prohibition on Vigilante Collaboration Matter?

The Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Program, administered through the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, is a national network of over 5,400 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. ICAC task forces are the gold standard for investigating online child exploitation. They operate under strict protocols developed over decades of experience—protocols that exist not to protect predators, but to ensure that investigations produce constitutionally sound convictions that actually hold up in court.

Among the most fundamental of these protocols is a clear prohibition on collaboration with civilian vigilante groups. This isn’t bureaucratic red tape. As the Michigan Attorney General stated in a 2019 directive: “Well-meaning vigilantes not only endanger themselves, but their actions may result in important evidence being suppressed, impeding our ability to properly and effectively do our job.” The Michigan State Police ICAC commander echoed this: “Taking matters into your own hands is dangerous and extremely harmful to a successful prosecution. Digital evidence collection has strict rules that must be followed for a case to legally move forward.”

The Knoxville Police Department’s ICAC Task Force Commander put it even more plainly: “Those actions actually hurt our cases.” The Southern Virginia ICAC Task Force states on its official website that it “cannot condone cyber vigilantism or accept any cases/leads developed via intentional investigations performed by non-law enforcement.” The Blount County Sheriff in Alabama warned that working with vigilante groups would “put them at risk of losing all the resources they need to prosecute predators.”

The reason for this consensus is simple: untrained civilians operating without constitutional guardrails produce tainted evidence, create dangerous confrontations, and generate cases that ultimately collapse—letting genuinely dangerous individuals walk free. The ICAC framework exists to protect children by ensuring that when predators are caught, they stay caught.

“Prohibited from Working with Vigilantes.”

— ICAC protocol reference found in DBPD’s own internal email production (FL Sunshine Req.)

 

Which is what makes the Delray Beach situation so extraordinary. DBPD’s own internal email production contains a reference to ICAC protocol that states, in plain terms: “Prohibited from Working with Vigilantes.” (FL Sunshine Req., supra.) The very next page of the production shows that DBPD approved the vigilante collaboration anyway. (Id.) Even more troubling, Detective Michael Liberta—who serves on the ICAC Task Force—works on 561 Predator Catcher warrant requests. (Id.) An ICAC officer directly involved in cases that violate the very protocols his task force membership requires him to follow.

 

The Legal Framework: When Vigilantes Become Agents of the State

To understand why this matters legally, it is necessary to understand what happens when civilians cross the line from private actors into agents of law enforcement—because once they do, every constitutional protection that applies to police applies to them as well.

Under Florida law, an agency relationship exists when civilians act as agents of law enforcement. Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1993). The test focuses on whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and whether the party performing the conduct intended to assist law enforcement efforts.

The Harvard Law Review’s seminal analysis of entrapment law confirms that “when persons who are not law-enforcement officials act with official encouragement or assistance, they should be treated as government agents for purposes of the entrapment defense. Otherwise, its protection could be avoided by indirection.” Note, Entrapment, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1341 (1960). The same authority provides that “the defense should be allowed when the inducement comes from a private policeman or detective, or a member of an organized citizens’ vigilance group” because “such persons are an actual, though unofficial, part of society’s law-enforcement machinery.” Id.

Catcher 1 testified under oath that he conducts operations in Delray Beach specifically because he knows DBPD “will act on the cases and actually take these serious.”

— Catcher 1 Deposition

 

561 Predator Catchers unquestionably meets this standard. Catcher 1 himself confirmed the agency relationship by testifying under oath that he conducts operations in Delray Beach specifically because he knows DBPD “will act on the cases and actually take these serious.” (Catcher 1 Deposition) This is not a citizen who happens to stumble across criminal activity and reports it to police. This is a civilian who selects his operating jurisdiction based on which police department will validate his work—and who has been given the tools, training, and institutional backing to function as a de facto arm of the department.

 

In Their Own Words: What DBPD’s Internal Emails Actually Say

When the Palm Beach Post investigated this story in February 2025, DBPD spokesperson Ted White offered a firm denial: “The Delray Beach Police Department is in no way affiliated with these groups.” Police Chief Russ Major declined multiple interview requests.

But the department’s own documents tell a very different story. What follows are direct quotes from DBPD’s internal emails and memoranda—the department’s own words, written by its own officers and supervisors, produced in discovery pursuant to the Florida Sunshine Law (Fla. Stat. Ch. 119).


The Kelly Memorandum

On July 8, 2024, Sergeant Casey Kelly issued a memorandum to all sworn personnel that stated:

“Since April, the vigilante group ‘561 Predator Catchers’ has generated 13 new cases involving alleged child predators.”

— Sgt. Casey Kelly Memorandum, July 8, 2024 (FL Sunshine Req.)

 

The department’s own supervisor, in an official memorandum, used the word “vigilante” to describe the group—and simultaneously acknowledged that this vigilante group was the source of the department’s caseload. The same memorandum revealed a critical detail: The C/A Persons Unit has met with the Special Victims Unit at the State Attorney’s Office to discuss these concerns as well as with Catcher 1 of 561PC to address issues during the ‘catch’ phase. (Id.) The memo also disclosed that 561PC was “currently working with two separate decoy groups: People v Preds & Predator Catchers INC.” The department didn’t merely know about the vigilante operation—it held meetings with the vigilantes and with prosecutors about how to manage the results.

The same memorandum acknowledged the State Attorney’s Office’s own concerns: “[I]t is the preference of the SAO to not make a physical arrest as these cases often require further follow-up.” (Id.) The SAO itself was signaling discomfort with the way these cases were being handled.


The De Bree Directive

Captain Michael De Bree ordered special scrutiny for 561PC cases, writing:

“Regarding the 561 Predator Catchers, moving forward, anytime they generate a call for service, I will need the watch commander (or their designee) to vet each call and determine the course of action.”

— Captain Michael De Bree (FL Sunshine Req.)

 

When a police captain orders special vetting for calls from a particular source, that is an institutional acknowledgment that the source is problematic. De Bree’s email went on to recommend requiring sworn statements from the vigilante operators, requesting certified documents including “[Catcher 1]’s phone records,” and using the newly enacted FSS 843.31 (the “Halo Law”) to make it “more difficult for them to record the incident.” (Id.) Rather than shutting down the unconstitutional partnership, command staff was strategizing how to manage the public relations problem created by livestreamed vigilante confrontations.


The Lunsford Admission

In an April 28, 2024 email, Sergeant Howard Lunsford wrote to Sergeant Kelly with a candid assessment:

“The only real way to push through a clean prosecution is if their decoy hands over communications to law enforcement prior to any meetup.”

— Sgt. Howard Lunsford, April 28, 2024 (FL Sunshine Req.)

 

Lunsford then revealed something critical about Catcher 1’s priorities: “I told [Catcher 1] to do that… He said he would do that, but I doubt it, since it means his role would be marginalized and he wouldn’t have any video to post on social media.” (Id.)

A DBPD sergeant wrote, in a discoverable email, that Catcher 1 would likely refuse to follow proper evidence procedures because doing so would reduce his social media content.

 

Read that again. A DBPD sergeant wrote, in a discoverable email, that Catcher 1 would likely refuse to follow proper evidence procedures because doing so would reduce his social media content. Lunsford continued: “I told him what would likely happen if he persisted on doing it his way, and not to get bent out of shape over the outcome if that’s what he chose to do.” (Id.) This is a DBPD supervisor acknowledging that Catcher 1 prioritizes YouTube content over producing legitimate criminal prosecutions—and that the department knew it and continued the relationship regardless.

The coaching did not stop there. DBPD’s own shift notes documented that on April 27, 2024, when 561 Predator Catchers were active at a Walmart, “Sgt. Lunsford educated them in detail about the proper procedures, legalities, and PD notification timelines to successfully arrest and prosecute those cases.” (Id.)


The Leon Chain-of-Custody Directive

By May 2025, the evidence problems had become so severe that Sergeant Oscar Leon was forced to issue a corrective:

“We can no longer accept a file given to [Catcher 1] by the decoy and then it be given to us by [Catcher 1]. The file must be uploaded directly to evidence.com from the decoy.”

— Sgt. Oscar Leon, May 2025 (FL Sunshine Req.)

 

This is an official acknowledgment that the chain of custody in these cases had been broken—and that months of prior cases had been prosecuted under a process the department itself now recognized as constitutionally deficient. Leon followed up with an even starker warning: “Without the names/proof of identification or sworn recorded statements from the decoys, these cases will not be investigated further [and] will not be accepted by the state attorney.” (Id.) The department’s own sergeant was telling his officers that the vigilante group’s cases were being rejected because they failed to meet basic evidentiary standards.

Critically, in a conversation with defense attorneys Alan S. Bernstein and Greg Morse, Sgt. Leon—the very officer in charge of these cases—admitted that one of DBPD’s biggest concerns with the 561 Predator Catchers operation is danger to the public. This admission from the department’s own investigative lead is devastating to any argument that the vigilante partnership serves public safety interests.

 

DBPD’s Knowledge of Evidence Destruction, AI-Manufactured Evidence, Chain-of-Custody Violations, and the Use of Illegal Decoys

Internal communications obtained through Florida’s public records laws reveal that the Delray Beach Police Department’s (“DBPD”) knowledge of the vigilante operation’s deficiencies extended far beyond mere chain-of-custody concerns. These records demonstrate that DBPD was aware that 561 Predator Catchers (“561PC”) “illegally uses decoys, ‘employees that act like juveniles.’” (FL Sunshine Req., supra.) The department possessed actual knowledge that the civilian operatives it relied upon were deploying adult individuals to pose as minors—a practice that, standing alone, raises grave due process concerns regarding the fundamental integrity of any resulting prosecution.

Subsequent depositions taken across numerous cases involving DBPD and 561PC have exposed an even more troubling practice: 561PC’s systematic use of artificial intelligence photo generation to manufacture evidence of crime. Specifically, 561PC operatives utilized applications such as FaceApp and Facetune to digitally alter photographs of adults, manipulating their facial features to make them appear younger and thereby fabricating the visual appearance of a minor. (Id.) This is not mere image enhancement—it is the digital fabrication of evidence. By creating AI-altered photographs designed to induce a target into believing they are communicating with a minor, 561PC was not merely detecting criminal conduct; it was manufacturing the very conditions upon which the State’s prosecution depends.

Deposition testimony has further revealed that Decoy 1—operating through the YouTube channel People vs Preds—was actively wiping devices and destroying evidence related to these operations. (Id.) The deliberate destruction of digital evidence—the very devices that would contain the complete, unedited communications between operatives and targets—represents a calculated effort to prevent the defense from examining the full scope of the operation’s methods. This spoliation deprives the accused of the ability to challenge the authenticity and completeness of the evidence presented against them, constituting a direct assault on their Sixth Amendment right to confront the evidence and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

Despite the fact that DBPD knew or should have known of these practices—evidence fabrication through AI photo manipulation, systematic evidence destruction, and the use of illegal decoys—the department continued its collaboration with these vigilante operations unabated. This willful blindness, or worse, tacit endorsement, implicates not only DBPD but raises the question of whether any party to this prosecution—including the West Palm Beach State Attorney’s Office—has considered the serious criminal liability arising from the wanton disregard of both Florida and federal computer crime statutes.

 

Violations of Florida and Federal Law

A. Violations of Florida Law

1. Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence — Fla. Stat. § 918.13

Section 918.13, Florida Statutes, criminalizes the fabrication of physical evidence and the destruction or concealment of evidence with intent to impair its availability in a pending or prospective investigation or official proceeding. The conduct at issue here implicates both prongs of this statute. The use of FaceApp and Facetune to digitally alter adult photographs to simulate the appearance of a minor constitutes the affirmative manufacturing of evidence—creating a fictitious visual representation designed to serve as the evidentiary foundation for criminal prosecution. Simultaneously, Decoy 1’s systematic device-wiping constitutes the knowing destruction of physical evidence. Both offenses are classified as third-degree felonies under Florida law.

2. Florida Computer Crimes Act — Fla. Stat. Ch. 815

Section 815.04, Florida Statutes, addresses computer-related offenses against intellectual property, prohibiting the willful, knowing, and unauthorized modification of data or programs. The digital alteration of photographs through AI applications to create fictitious evidence of juvenile identity falls squarely within this provision—the operatives knowingly modified digital data to fabricate evidence that did not previously exist.

Section 815.06, Florida Statutes, prohibits offenses against computer users, including the use of a computer to commit fraud or to obtain property through false pretenses. The creation of fabricated juvenile personas through digitally manipulated images—deployed to deceive targets into engaging in criminal conduct—constitutes fraud-adjacent conduct facilitated through computer systems.

3. Criminal Use of Personal Identification Information — Fla. Stat. § 817.568

The creation of entirely fabricated identities—fictitious juveniles brought to life through digitally altered images of real adults—implicates Section 817.568, Florida Statutes, which criminalizes the fraudulent use of personal identification information. By manufacturing false identities complete with AI-generated photographs, the operatives created fictitious persons whose purported existence formed the basis of the State’s allegations.

4. Falsifying Records and Official Misconduct — Fla. Stat. § 839.13

To the extent that DBPD officers possessed knowledge of the evidence fabrication and destruction detailed above and either failed to act, actively concealed these practices, or incorporated the tainted evidence into official proceedings, Section 839.13, Florida Statutes, regarding the falsification of official records and related misconduct, is directly implicated.

5. Interception of Communications — Fla. Stat. § 934.03

Florida is a two-party consent state. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful to intercept or record wire, oral, or electronic communications without the consent of all parties. If 561PC or People vs Preds recorded communications with targets without proper authorization—and DBPD subsequently relied upon those recordings—additional violations of Florida’s wiretap statute are implicated, potentially rendering all such recordings inadmissible and subjecting the interceptors to criminal liability.

B. Violations of Federal Law

1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act — 18 U.S.C. § 1030

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) provides the federal analogue to Florida’s computer crime statutes. The use of computer applications to manufacture fraudulent evidence—specifically, the digital manipulation of photographs to fabricate the appearance of minors—could constitute fraud in connection with computers under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), which prohibits knowingly accessing a computer with intent to defraud and thereby obtaining anything of value. Additionally, § 1030(a)(5), which addresses the knowing transmission of programs, information, code, or commands that intentionally cause damage to protected computers, may apply to the systematic corruption of digital evidence through AI manipulation tools.

2. Destruction or Falsification of Records — 18 U.S.C. § 1519

Decoy 1’s deliberate wiping of devices constitutes a textbook violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which criminalizes the knowing destruction, alteration, or falsification of records, documents, or tangible objects with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, or in relation to any case filed under title 11, or in contemplation of any such matter. Critically, § 1519 does not require that a federal investigation be pending at the time of destruction—it is sufficient that such an investigation was reasonably foreseeable. This offense carries a maximum penalty of twenty (20) years’ imprisonment.

3. Obstruction of Justice — 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)

Section 1512(c) of Title 18 prohibits any person from corruptly altering, destroying, mutilating, or concealing a record, document, or other object, or attempting to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. Both dimensions of the misconduct at issue—the AI-driven photo manipulation and the deliberate device destruction—fall within this statute’s prohibitions. The fabrication of digitally altered images corrupts evidence at its source, while the device-wiping eliminates the ability of courts and defense counsel to examine the unaltered originals.

4. Wire Fraud — 18 U.S.C. § 1343

The operatives’ use of internet-connected applications to create fraudulent personas—complete with digitally fabricated images transmitted electronically to deceive targets—constitutes a scheme or artifice to defraud carried out through wire communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Each electronic transmission of an AI-altered photograph to a target represents a separate use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.

5. Federal Wiretap Act — 18 U.S.C. § 2511

If 561PC or People vs Preds intercepted or recorded electronic communications with targets without proper authorization, and DBPD subsequently incorporated those recordings into its investigation, the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, is implicated. This is particularly significant given that Florida’s two-party consent requirement under Fla. Stat. § 934.03 provides even broader protections than federal law. Any recordings obtained in violation of these statutes are subject to suppression, and the persons responsible for the unauthorized interceptions face both criminal penalties and civil liability.

The cumulative weight of these statutory violations cannot be understated. The vigilante operatives upon whom the State’s case depends were not merely overzealous civilians—they were engaged in conduct that may have independently violated multiple provisions of both Florida and federal criminal law. DBPD’s continued collaboration with these operatives, despite what should have been knowledge of these practices, renders the department complicit in the very criminal conduct it purported to combat. The Courts should consider whether the prosecution’s reliance on evidence procured through such pervasive illegality comports with fundamental notions of due process and the integrity of the judicial system.

 

Decoy Non-Cooperation and Evidence Withholding

A May 2025 shift note records that Catcher 1 “requested that Officers stage in the area until he was ready for our presence. This was denied.” (FL Sunshine Req., supra.) A civilian vigilante was attempting to direct police officers on when and where to position themselves. The same note records that Decoy 1 “refused to turn over the communication” to officers and “refused to provide a statement.” (Id.) Sergeant Leon was forced to instruct: “Officer Kozak, please document in your report that the decoy in this case did not want to cooperate with the case and leave the case inactive.” (Id.)

“Both [Catcher 1] and [Decoy 1] were displeased with Officers deterring a ‘catch.’”

— DBPD Shift Note (FL Sunshine Req.)

 

And when officers tried to follow proper procedures, the shift note reveals the reaction: “Both [Catcher 1] and [Decoy 1] were displeased with Officers deterring a ‘catch.’” (Id.) The vigilantes were angry when police tried to do their jobs properly.


The Jones Warning and “The List”

Officer Imani Jones of the Delray Beach police noted in a June 1, 2024 email: “Officers have made arrests for things that other officers are stating don’t meet the criteria for the arrest.” (FL Sunshine Req., supra.) This is an officer putting in writing that the pressure to validate 561PC’s “catches” was leading to arrests that fellow officers considered legally unjustified.

The same email contained a revealing detail: “One of the workers, [Catcher 1], advised that he had met with you sometime last year and was provided a list of what he would need to provide to officers for an arrest to be made. He stated that he has been providing those things, but yet no arrests are being made.” (Id.) Catcher 1 told a patrol officer that he had previously met with the detective assigned to these cases and was given a checklist of exactly what evidence to provide to facilitate arrests. This is not the passive receipt of citizen tips. This is a law enforcement detective coaching a civilian vigilante on how to build cases.


ICAC Detectives Processing 561PC Cases

Perhaps the most alarming evidence of institutional integration is an email from Detective Michael Liberta of the DBPD’s Violent Crimes Division and ICAC Task Force. On July 11, 2024, Detective Liberta emailed an Assistant State Attorney with the subject line “561 Predator Phone Warrant,” writing: “Good Morning My Favorite ASA. Can you please review and let me know when to drop into vsigner.” The attachment was titled “561 Predator Christopher Burt.docx.” (FL Sunshine Req., supra.) An ICAC Task Force detective was drafting phone search warrants in 561 Predator Catcher cases—the very task force whose federal protocols prohibit collaboration with vigilante groups had a member actively processing cases generated by those groups.

 

CAD Dispatch Logs Reveal Real-Time Coordination Between DBPD and 561 Predator Catchers

Beyond the internal emails, recently obtained Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) logs provide what may be the most damning evidence of active, real-time coordination between 561 Predator Catchers and the Delray Beach Police Department.

The CAD logs—the official dispatch records that document every call for service and every police response—reveal a pattern that goes far beyond a police department passively responding to citizen calls. In multiple instances documented in the CAD system, 561 Predator Catchers and Catcher 1 requested that DBPD delay their arrival so that Catcher 1 could first place phone calls to the alleged target before police presence “spooked” the individual and caused them to leave. In many of these cases, DBPD complied with the request, allowing a civilian vigilante to dictate the timing and tempo of what was effectively a law enforcement operation.

A civilian with no law enforcement training, no constitutional authority, and a monetized YouTube channel was directing police officers to hold back while he conducted his own pre-arrival procedures.


The implications are staggering. A civilian with no law enforcement training, no constitutional authority, and a monetized YouTube channel was directing police officers to hold back while he conducted his own pre-arrival procedures—including telephone calls designed to lure the target into remaining at the location. The CAD logs further show that in many cases, DBPD officers arrived on scene and had discussions with Catcher 1 before even observing any individual suspected of wrongdoing. Officers were not responding to criminal activity they witnessed. They were responding to a civilian’s request for law enforcement backup to support a pre-planned confrontation designed for YouTube content.

This is not a police department receiving tips from a concerned citizen. This is a police department functioning as the enforcement arm of a private media enterprise. The CAD logs—official government records generated in real time, not retrospective summaries—demonstrate a level of operational coordination that transforms 561 Predator Catchers from a private citizen group into a de facto undercover unit operating outside every constitutional safeguard that applies to actual law enforcement. As the Harvard Law Review warned decades ago, when civilians act “with official encouragement or assistance,” they become part of “society’s law-enforcement machinery”—and the Constitution applies in full. Entrapment, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 1341.

 

“We Are in No Way Affiliated”: The Chief’s Conference Room Tells a Different Story

Beyond the emails and CAD logs, the structural evidence of an institutional partnership is overwhelming.

DBPD held a formal “561 Predator Meeting” in the Chief’s Conference Room, attended by Assistant Chief Hunter and multiple Captains. (FL Sunshine Req., supra.) DBPD officers provided Catcher 1 with detailed instructions on how to be “more successful in his catches.” (Id.) DBPD met with the State Attorney’s Office specifically about these cases, then communicated the SAO’s concerns directly to Catcher 1. (Id.) All evidence from Catcher 1 was uploaded to official police evidence management systems. (Id.)

Lieutenant Kelly provided Catcher 1 with guidelines to make cases “stronger.” (Sergeant Kratz deposition) DBPD provided specific guidelines designed to “avoid entrapment.” (Deputy Soto deposition) Catcher 1 received business cards from officers and maintained direct contact with Sergeant Leon. (Catcher 1 Deposition)

 

Body-Worn Camera: DBPD Officers Directed 561PC to Create a YouTube Channel

Perhaps most strikingly, in body-worn camera footage from June 2024, Catcher 1 made an admission that reframes the entire relationship between DBPD and 561 Predator Catchers. Catcher 1 stated directly to officers on camera:

“Let me get something straight, we did this for 3 months before anything was ever posted, your guy’s cops told us to post it. We never had a channel, we never did nothing.”

— Catcher 1, Body-Worn Camera footage, June 2024

 

If accurate—and the statement was made on body-worn camera that is part of the official record—DBPD didn’t merely tolerate the public humiliation of suspects before trial. The department directed Catcher 1 to create the very YouTube channel that became the engine of 561 Predator Catchers’ monetized operation. This fact was further confirmed in the sworn deposition of Catcher 1, where he testified that a DBPD officer suggested the creation of his YouTube channel. (Officer Imani Jones BWC) By directing Catcher 1 to create a public-facing YouTube channel, DBPD effectively launched a revenue-generating enterprise built on the public humiliation of uncharged individuals—individuals who are constitutionally presumed innocent.

The Palm Beach Post quantified the result: “With Catcher 1’s help, the agency arrested more people suspected of traveling to meet a minor for sex in 2024 than it had in the prior five years combined.” After an 18-month period in which prosecutors filed no such cases, more than 20 were filed within five months. Every probable cause report began with a reference to 561 Predator Catchers.

  *

COMING IN PART 2

In Part 2, we examine the constitutional consequences of this partnership: how DBPD officers stood by while Catcher 1 conducted Miranda-violating interrogations, the coercive physical tactics used on uncharged suspects, a very low conviction rate that proves these methods fail to protect children, the financial incentives driving the operation, selective prosecution of targets while ignoring felonies committed by the vigilantes themselves, and what it all means for communities across America.

 

Note: This article is based on publicly available court filings, sworn deposition testimony, internal police communications produced pursuant to a Florida Sunshine Law public records request (Fla. Stat. Ch. 119), CAD dispatch logs, body-worn camera footage, and published investigative journalism from the Palm Beach Post, CBS12 News, WPTV, WPBF, BocaNewsNow, Caplin News (FIU), and various podcast interviews given by individuals associated with 561 Predator Catchers. All defendants referenced herein are presumed innocent. The characterization of DBPD’s relationship with 561 Predator Catchers reflects allegations supported by the documentary record cited herein. The Delray Beach Police Department has denied affiliation with 561 Predator Catchers.

 

If you or someone you know has been arrested following a confrontation with 561 Predator Catchers, People vs Preds, or any other vigilante predator-catching group in Palm Beach County or anywhere in South Florida, contact the Law Office of Alan S. Bernstein for a confidential consultation. These cases involve unique constitutional defenses that require experienced criminal defense counsel.

 

Related Topics: 561 Predator Catchers Lawyer | People vs Preds Defense Attorney | Delray Beach Entrapment Defense | ICAC Violations Florida | Predator Catcher Arrest Defense | Vigilante Sting Operation Defense | Criminal Defense Attorney Palm Beach County | Florida Two-Party Consent Violations | Giglio Notice | Selective Prosecution Florida | Outrageous Government Conduct Defense | Miranda Rights Violation | YouTube Vigilante Florida | People vs Preds Defense | 561 Predator Catchers Defense | Motion to Dismiss Entrapment | CAD Dispatch Logs Police Coordination | Coercive Interrogation Tactics | Baker Act Vigilante Florida 561 Predator Catchers | People vs Preds | Delray Beach Police Department | ICAC Protocol Violations | Entrapment Defense | Vigilante Sting Operations Florida | Criminal Defense Palm Beach County

 
 
 

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